CHESTER HAS MOVED!: Conservative Critiques of the War, Part I: Introduction

Monday, January 10, 2005

Conservative Critiques of the War, Part I: Introduction

[This post started out as an update on the feud between Rumsfeld and his generals in the Army, but I've decided to turn it into Part I of what we envision to be a four part series on conservative critiques of the war.] In a recent intelligence report from Strategic Forecasting, the premier private intelligence agency, George Friedman draws attention to a memo by Lt Gen James R. Helmly, the head of the US Army Reserve.
Addressed to the chief of staff of the Army, the memo stated that the Army Reserve was in danger of becoming a "broken force," due to personnel policies adopted by the Army and the Department of Defense. Helmly wrote, "The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the Army Reserve's inability . . . to meet mission requirements associated with Iraq and Afghanistan and to reset and regenerate its forces for follow-on and future missions." When a three-star general writes a memo containing these words to the chief of staff, and then leaks the memo to the press (it did not arrive at the Sun through telepathy), what you have is a major revolt by senior Army commanders. Helmly may have been more incautious than others, but he is far from alone in his view that the force in general is broken. More directly, if the Army Reserve is unable to carry out its mission, the same can likely be said for National Guard units. This means that the Army in general, which is heavily dependent on both to carry out its mission, won't be able to do so. What the generals are saying is that the Army itself is unable to carry out its mission.
A little background is necessary here to understand why Friedman concludes that if the Reserves are broken, the Army on a whole is as well. After Viet Nam, the nation's military leadership decided that in the future they did not want to fight another unpopular war. They therefore restructured the US Army such that nearly all of its combat support and combat service support units were transferred to the Reserves. We've heard various figures but for some specialties, close to 90% of the personnel needed for some key support missions are reservists. The thinking on the part of the Army leadership, specifically Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, was that since any large scale deployment of Army combat forces would require combat service support personnel to be activated, that politicians would be hesitant to commit the Army to a large-scale conflict unless they were sure that it would be supported be an electorate totally fine with watching its citizen soldiers deploy and possibly die. This situation continues today. One reason why such a large number of the Army personnel deployed in iraq are reservists is because there simply are no active-duty troops who do their jobs. These are the unglamorous jobs that do not make headlines, but without which an Army grinds to a halt: bulk fuel operations, motor transport, military police, civil affairs specialists, supply specialists, etc. (Certainly our Army vet readers will correct our mistakes here, but we're pretty sure this is the case.) The second constraint that the military runs up against is that reservists by law can only be activated for two years at a time, after which there is some minimum period when they must return to civilian life. It is these two constraints of force structure to which Lt Gen Helmly refers. Thus, when he speaks of an inability to regenerate his forces, this is what he means. There could be other concerns as well, such as unexpected, unplanned for, and unfixable wear and tear on equipment and such. But the central part is force structure. Friedman continues:
Rumsfeld believes that there is a revolution in warfare under way. As the author of The Future of War , I completely agree with him. However, as I stated in that book, the revolution is just getting under way and will not be mature for generations. It is not ready to carry the warfighting burden of the United States, although it can certainly support it. Until that revolution matures, traditional forces, particularly the Army, will need to be maintained and, in time of war, expanded. Rumsfeld's view is that the revolution is more mature than that and that warfare can now be carried out with minimal Army forces. In some ways, Rumsfeld was right when he focused on the conventional invasion of Iraq. A relatively small force was able to defeat the main Iraqi force. Where he made his mistake, in my opinion, was in not recognizing that the occupation of Iraq required substantial manpower and that much of that manpower was in the reserves. He compounded that mistake enormously when he failed to recognize that an organized insurgency was under way in Iraq. Counterinsurgency operations is one area in which the revolution in warfare has made little progress, and Rumsfeld should have hit the panic button on Army force structure when the insurgency picked up steam. In Iraq, Rumsfeld was going to fight a guerrilla war, and he was going to need a lot of infantry and armor to do it. If, in addition to fighting the guerrilla war, Rumsfeld planned to carry out other operations in the region and maintain a strategic reserve, he needed to expand the Army dramatically. Rumsfeld made three mistakes. First, he overestimated the breadth and depth of the revolution in warfare. Second, he underestimated the challenges posed by counterinsurgency operations, particularly in urban areas. Mistakes are inevitable, but his third mistake was amazing: he could not recognize that he had made the first two mistakes. That meant that he never corrected any of the mistakes. There is another way to look at this. The United States is in a global war. Personnel policies have not been radically restructured to take into account either that the U.S. needs a wartime force structure or that that force structure must be congruent with the type and tempo of operations that will be undertaken. Not only doesn't the force stretch, but the force is not built to stretch. Hence, Helmly's memo.
Friedman's thesis is thus: 1. Rumsfeld is correct about the changing nature of war, but wrong about the tempo of the change. 2. The US needs drastically more troops in Iraq. Friedman even mentions that the US' personnel policies "have not been radically restructured to take into account either that the U.S. needs a wartime force structure or that that force structure must be congruent with the type and tempo of operations that will be undertaken." But he doesn't quite go the whole nine yards and say what is left unsaid: The US cannot commit more troops to Iraq because it has no more troops to commit. Troops must be cycled and rotated on a manageable schedule. We have maxed that out. Any further increase in troop rotations would leave us strategically vulnerable in other theaters. 150,000 or so at a time is the best we can do. That should give one pause. Is that enough to defeat China? We've said this before, here. But Chester's theories on force structure is not quite the purpose of this post and we digress. The questions that all of this raises are numerous. Who is right, Rummy, or his generals? Or could both of them be right? Four documents help us untangle this mystery to get to the heart of what Rumsfeld's thinking is. The first is the book, "Rumsfeld: A Personal Portrait," by Midge Decter, who is married to the eminent conservative Norman Podhoretz, and is a personal friend of the Rumsfeld. While she has been charged as being an apologist for Rummy, that certainly means that she knows her stuff as well as anyone else about what he thinks. We read this book last week and found it to be similar to "Rumsfeld's War" which we've previously recommended, but with differing details [links to both in the sidebar]. In Chapter 6 of her book, Decter offers us this view of the Pentagon as it was when Rummy came to rule:
. . . on the other hand, while the military was no longer sunk in the post-Vietnam atmosphere of failure and depression of the 1970s and had long since come to be at ease about presiding over an all-volunteer force, they were still very far from being in as vibrant and feisty a condition as their twenty-first secretary. One of the reasons for this was that little by little over the years, and to a truly marked degree during the Clinton administration, Congress had in effect replaced the executive branch in the job of looking after the Pentagon. There were now hundreds of people working in the building whose only role was to serve members of Congress" answering their inquiries, tending to their interests, and doing them favors. And the favors done for congressmen were only too duly reciprocated: it seemed that virtually every special budgetary request, along with every new weapons system, not to speak of many a no-longer-needed military base, had its advocates in the House and Senate. An inevitable – and for Rumsfeld a most trying – corollary was that there were now many members of Congress who expected that he, too, along with his new appointees, would be offering them his full attention. The way of life of the Pentagon had also been very much influenced by the fact that, again, most particularly during the Clinton administration, a number of appointees in the Department of Defense had themselves once been members of Congress. Legislators being people who are – and who are in the nature of things required to be – dependent for their effectiveness on the building of consensus, they tend to be more forgiving of one another's weaknesses than would, say, most business executives. The result was a notable falling off of something essential to both the makers of war and the keepers of peace: a willingness to give an accounting of onself. Aside from the sheer organizational differences created in such an atmosphere, the serious abdication of authority over the military by Bill Clinton (and inevitably, therefore, also of the secretaries of defense who had served under him) led to certain other problems. I had for one thing, become virtually impossible to keep any military secrets: Legislators who had the run of the Pentagon also often had friendly – and information-hungry – contacts in the press. Then, too, without civilian control the military, especially the staff of the joint chiefs, inevitably became the managers of their own affairs. This came more and more to mean that military promotions were determined on the basis not of ability but of congeniality with one's fellows. And this in turn meant that some of the most capable people, discouraged, in such an atmosphere about what a future with the armed forces might hold for them, were leaving the military for greener pastures. This was the situation into which Rumsfeld now entered . . . Under these circumstances, Bush and Rumsfeld agreed – to what would be the dismay of the Pentagon brass – not to request any increase in the military budget, at least no until the new secretary had completed a full-scale assessment of the country's military doctrine. In addition to military doctrine, Rumsfeld would also be required to undertake a top-to-bottom review of the current state of the country's military capabilities.
Now Midge Decter could be more or less right or wrong about the state of affairs in the DoD upon Rummy's arrival, but the important thing is that she documents the perception of that state among the new Bush administration. This goes a long way toward background in explaining the ease with which Army generals now "rebel" against Rummy. So Rummy thought he would freeze budget (and therefore troop) increases until he had a chance to take a good sizing-up of the place. And he made success in increasing the number of warfighters available from the same pool of personnel. As noted in the National Review, in an article advising readers not to throw out the transformation bathwater with Rumsfeld if and when he goes,
. . .the pressure of transformation Rumsfeld has exerted on the Army has caused it to reorganize so that it can send more soldiers to the field than before. Theoretically there are even more troops available from the same pool than when the secretary took over the Pentagon.
So, while Rummy may be slow in recognizing or asking for increases in the size of the military, he has made the existing force much more effective as a warfighting organization. This still leaves the question unanswered as to who is right bout Iraq, Rummy or the generals? We believe both. In fact, the most cogent part of Friedman's analysis above is that Rumsfeld has misjudged the pace of "transformation." What do we think of transformation? Well . . . that is a big question. Assuming that you mean Rummy's version of it (there are several versions, many contradictory), we agree with him that information technology can make the armed forces dramatically better at killing people and destroying things on the battlefield, and that this will mean a smaller, lighter, faster force can do much the same as the larger forces of yesterday. But at the same time, we can't help but think that we mustn't think that war will become a standoff, sterile activity, conducted by computers, robots, and UAVs. Man makes war and man will alays have an integral role to play not only in its conception, but in its execution as well. A long time ago, in 1994, when maneuver warfare concepts were going mainstream, H.J. Poole, a retired Marine Gunnery Sergeant, wrote a book called, "The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare." In it he notes that the United States has a history of relying upon technology rather than tactical prowess, for its victories. Consider this statement, which Poole quotes, from retired Army General A. Collins:
In my judgment our forces were not as well trained as those of the enemy, especially in the early stages of the fighting. After the buildup of forces, when we went on the offensive, we did not defeat the enemy tactically. We overpowered and overwhelmed our enemies with equipment and firepower.
Maneuver warfare is a doctrine that attempts to out-think the enemy. To the extent that "transformation" enables this – defeat by ruse, strategem, or superior thinking – we wholeheartedly support it. To the extent that "transformation" promises cleaner battles through the use of better and more networked lethal technology – well, we'll take our victories anyway we can get them, but show us where it is written that the US will always be technologically dominant over other countries. Perish the thought, but it just ain't so. And this technological dominance carries within it the seed of its own undoing, excellently described in a letter to the editor to the Weekly Standard, published on Monday, and written by Stuart Koehl, a senior fellow in Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. Mr. Koehl notes the following:
I've written at great length, mainly for internal government consumption, on some of what I see as the logical and strategic fallacies of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA). From my perspective, the most serious of these can be characterized as follows: First, it is an attempt to reduce war to an engineering problem through the use of information technology to eliminate uncertainty. That one does not know where the enemy is, or what the enemy intends is the source of that uncertainty, and the fact that the enemy is an intelligent and dynamic adversary allows him to exploit that uncertainty to undermine one's plans and objectives. Under RMA theory, now generally called "Network Centric Warfare" (NCW), myriad streams of information are brought together through digital networks to present the commander with a God's eye view of the battlefield: in theory he knows were all of his forces are, and all of the enemy's forces, their status and what they are doing or intending to do. He can then allocate precision strike systems to attack the enemy before he can mass or close to attack friendly forces. However, this reliance on distributed sensor networks creates the seeds of its own undoing, for the enemy can not only attack the networks directly ("cyber-attack"), but can also resort to various deception measures to create a false picture upon which the commander would act. More simple still, he can flood the network with so much spurious data (noise) that the battle command system never manages to catch up; under the torrent of inaccessible information, the enemy can move at will. More insidious still, it creates a "scope dope" mentality in which "reality" is what appears on the situational display screen, not what is actually happening on the battlefield. Second, the RMA is still rooted in the 20th century paradigm of armored-mechanized warfare between sophisticated nation-states. Its origins can be found in the deadlock of the NATO Central Front in the 1980s, when the US was looking for ways of destroying Soviet second echelon forces, and the USSR was exploring ways of breaking through NATO's front lines. The convergence of several technologies--remote sensors, high speed computers and networks, and long-range, precision-guided weapons--allowed in theory for the creation of what the USSR called "reconnaissance strike complexes" that would have the potential to break up or destroy conventional formations of tanks and armored vehicles from hundreds of miles away. This in turn would force the dispersion of forces into small packets, attempting to dominate spaces by fire rather than by physical occupation. In a situation where one has reconnaissance strike complexes and the other does not, any attempt by the enemy to concentrate his forces results in their destruction, while one can concentrate freely against the enemy's weakest points. We saw something very much like this during Operation Iraqi Freedom, where the US actually deployed primitive reconnaissance-strike complexes. Faced with this situation, the enemy has only two choices (other than surrender): to develop his own reconnaissance-strike capability, or to respond asymmetrically. If both sides have reconnaissance-strike capability, then both sides disperse, and war becomes a matter of trying to find and destroy each other's reconnaissance strike systems, after which one side or the other has an insurmountable advantage. However, in reality no country other than the US has the economic wherewithal to develop such a capability. Thus, the US has become effectively invincible in conventional warfare: regardless of the adversary, the result would have been much the same as Iraq (though a few armies might have given us a run for our money). Anyone wishing to oppose the United States militarily must therefore resort to asymmetrical warfare. And therein lies the third flaw of the RMA: for network centric warfare to be relevant, the enemy must employ conventional forces. Guerrillas, terrorists, economic warfare, cyber-warfare--in all of these cases, the enemy does not present the sensor network with the kinds of readily detectable, high-contrast targets that can be engaged by precision strike weapons. Instead, the enemy blends into the background, and gets within close combat range of US forces, where much of the firepower advantage is negated. Having been perfected by the US, our conventional capabilities have bred their own obsolescence, since adversaries will attempt to circumvent rather than engage them head-on. Does this mean, then, that there is no need for defense transformation, or that all of the RMA has been a dead end? By no means. The Army inherited by the Bush Administration in 2000 was not at all suited for the kind of war we find in Iraq and Afghanistan today. It wasn't even suitable for the operations we undertook in Bosnia, Kosovo or Somalia. It was organized, equipped and trained to fight the Warsaw Pact on the plains of central Europe, and not much more. Radical transformation was necessary, and the issue then should have been, What kind of transformation? The enhancement of high-intensity capabilities as was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq, while not suited for the predominant form of war in the 21st century, does serve a useful purpose: by so overshadowing the capabilities of potential adversaries, it deters them from competition in the conventional arena, and thus reduces the likelihood of high-intensity conventional war (which being the most destructive of all forms of war short of nuclear, should be avoided when possible). On the other hand, that very success increased the probability of asymmetrical responses such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and even the development of WMDs, which are the poor man's response to the overwhelming materiel capability of the US. Thus, a second transformational path was also required, one which focused on this "low end" warfare and its unique operational requirements. In contrast to conventional war, this type of warfare requires more emphasis on human factors--training, tactics, psychological warfare--than on high technology. It is a war fought by relatively small numbers of elite troops whose weapons are lighter, and far more discriminating than even the precision guided bombs on which we have come to rely. The enemy is hunted down in his lair, or out-thought in the realm of ideas. It is war where the main weapon might be a dagger, or a water pump, depending on the situation, since much of this kind of war involves civil-military affairs.
[As our series, "Conservative Critiques of the War" continues, readers will please excuse the many and varied topics which are touched upon. We'll make things as clear as possible but this is a tough onion to peel. Here are the future installments, each to come out on Monday of the next three weeks: Part II: Neo-realism Part III: Clash? More Like the Total War of Civilizations Part IV: Whither Fourth-Generation Warfare?]

19 Comments:

Anonymous Anonymous said...

As a student of military history I have always been stuck by how much change means things stay the same. As technology changed in ancient times, the side who used it got an edge. Weather they wrapped it around local terminology using what ever was say, Latin, for "Transformation" matters not. Course, writing about it provides countless papers for Masters degree candidates.
Rumsfeld's problem was always guerilla war. And it is only a problem if the guerillas can get out side help. We now have the same situation as we did in Vietnam. Sanctuary. The Syrians and Iranians can send people and supplies into Iraq with impunity. Til you solve that problem, Iraq will remain insecure.
Hoahao

January 11, 2005 at 5:05 AM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Very interesting direction with this piece. Couple quit comments if I may:

1. The entire arguement about RMA and whether Rummy mistook it's tempo...all irrelevant and moot. There is no such thing as a current RMA. Sorry. But nothing we see now is any different that we have seen for hundreds of years. The act of increasing or changing the way or dynamics of information flow is not a revolution. That is simply becoming more efficient.

There is no RMA. There is only what we do...and getting better at doing it. We are doing nothing different. Precession based weapons platforms were brought into play during the Vietnam era to take out bridges that were protected by SAMs and untouchable. Computers have been in use since the first ones were built to calcuation firing solutions for artillery and naval guns.

I could go on. Suffice it to say that there is no current RMA. We are only doing what we do better. We are nothing doing it different.

2. The concepts of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Generation Warfare are also incorrect. There is only war fare. You can call it what you will...label your's or your enemies doctrine, but we have seen all of the current "Generations" in use for the last 2000 years. The Mongols were using Manuever Warfare, the commanders intent, and autonimous unit leaders hundreds of years before the Germans were used to coin the term 3rd GW. And every people who have been invaded for centuries have used asymetrical tactics, "terrorism" (which we all know is a misnomer...a term that is based on your relationship to the terrorist...not his actions...one being a patriot...the other a terrorist and all that). Guerilla, asymetrical warfare, terrorism, insurgency...not the 4th Generation of Warfare...nothing could be further from the truth.

Keep up the good work. But to be honest, none of the people you are quoting have a thorough understanding of the subject. War is not about any one thing. Musashi writes that one should find the enemies center, his rythmn, and then break it. At the same time he suggest not relying on a single thing...it creates a clear rythmn for your enemy to find. What he is telling all of us...and what he understood in the 16th century that we have yet to understand...don't put all your eggs in one basket. And develope an Army (by that I mean the global variable...US Armed Forces) that has many rythmns.

What we need more than anything is more diversity, redundancy at certain levels, more troops to provide a large scale "over watch" if you will, and mulitple units capalbe of diverse tactics and operational art so that our enemies do not know our doctrine.

That's the ultimate point. And it's not a revolution. Sun Tzu spoke of it. Musashi Myamoto spoke of it.

CL

January 11, 2005 at 8:18 AM  
Blogger Jeff Kouba said...

Excellent stuff.

I've thought this is one of the thorniest problems facing the US since 9/11, as this global war (and it is indeed a global war) against terrorists moves on.

I don't think it's an accident, the connection between the remarkable success the US military enjoys in combat operations, and the military's desire to remain an all-volunteer professional military.

On the other hand, as you say, the current structure is not built to stretch, and does not stretch. This is a serious matter. I believe it has hindered the US from doing what it needs to in Syria and Iran. Both those states know the US can't undertake significant military operations against them, with so much manpower and equipment tied up in Iraq.

What's the answer? I don't know. Hence, the thorniness of the problem? A draft, and use draftees almost exclusively in the combat support roles? A call from the President for volunteers, a cry that the nation needs its young people?

January 11, 2005 at 9:05 AM  
Blogger Jamie Irons said...

Chester,

I really enjoyed your piece, and the comments have been helpful, too.

Since I find myself confused by the subject, and completely uncertain what our military and political leaders should do (beyond the obvious step of getting the American public more up to speed on the nature of the conflict we're engaged in) I suppose I must be on the point of learning something. (I have found a period of confusion often heralds a breakthrough ;-)


Jamie Irons

January 11, 2005 at 11:42 AM  
Blogger Geochem said...

I'm no military expert, far from it. Seems to me that the guerrilla war was fueled by our own press and our decision to fight a nice war. I'm not condoning torture, but when we define torture as putting panties on someones head, and Rumsfeld's head rolls because of it, it can only encourage the insurgency. If we fought as brutal as they would if they had our military capabilities there would be no issue of troop levels because it would be over. What the heck, no matter how nice we are they all hate us anyway.

January 11, 2005 at 4:48 PM  
Blogger Papa Ray said...

Hey, Hot damn, WOW !!

Excellent piece, and more than excellent comments. We need to funnel and force feed this to some of the weenies hiding in the funny looking building (or the building up the hill).

Just being an ol' grunt, I am not qualifed or even remotely informed, other that what I get over the internet and a few "good books".

But, being as how I am an American and a TEXAN, I am entitled to say and am going to say a few words about this interesting and complicated discussion (subject?).

You are all missing the fu***ing point!

We are already asshole deep and sinking fast, the only thing that matters is where the flesh meets the metal.

We got to make more of them die then they kill of us.

Sure, we been fighting this war on the cheap, that is old news and so far the guys doing the fighting have maintained, adusted and improvised. We don't need no fu**ing Generals telling these young men how to fight this war or where or when. THAT IS THE PROBLEM, just like it was when I was there up to my fu**ING eyebrows.

Send them beans, bullets and the freedom to fight the war as they see fit. Quit pulling them back and trying to put the muzzle on them.

The single most terrible mistake was made earlier this year (if you don't count letting our guys really destroy Bag-a-bad), is STOPPING them when they were going to destroy Fallujah earlier last year. Then telling them to handle the fight in the other cities with kid gloves and not to kill too many civilians.

This is a war, and no body seems to want to treat it as such. We want to fight a nice, tidy, septic war with the political correct posture and keep all our critics from pointing a finger and saying " The American Military are killing everyone and destroying the country and making millions of new enemies".

Well, guess what the f***ing what, they are saying all that and more ANYWAY.

If we do too little, they win, if we do too much, the Euroweenies and the liberweenies squeel, I say, forget them and continue and complete the mission!

Oh HELL, lets just drop one little bomb and see what they say?

Oh, hell, here I go again..

This IS my post

Papa Ray
West Texas
USA

P.S. Here at least is something constructive,here is a link from my favorite guy. Be sure and read the earlier interview he wrote back in 02. Link is at the end of this interview.

P.P.S Here is a little post I left for the Kurds , as usual I got carried away.

January 11, 2005 at 5:41 PM  
Blogger Papa Ray said...

Hey, well I can't figure out how to link to the comments, the # didn't work, so here it is c & p
_______________________________________________

Who is right, who is wrong? Who decieved who? Who neglects Who?

Greetings, health and happiness and safety to you and yours.

But, my wishes or nine hundred and ninety nine billion good wishes, won't do you any good, not one drop of good.

The same goes for advice and for reasons or excuses or predictions or any other form of verbage, words or discussions.

THIS IS A WAR, A WAR THAT WILL BE WON, IN ONE YEAR, TEN YEARS, A HUNDRED YEARS. ONE SIDE WILL WIN, ONE SIDE WILL LOSE. THE INNOCENTS INBETWEEN WILL DIE, BE WOUNDED, LOSE THEIR HOMES AND THEIR COMMERCE.

I can tell you that is just the way war is. Does that make it any better for those involved? I can tell everyone not involved, that their words and feelings are just wasted, does that make you feel any better or worse?

Everyone just wants no war and everything to be back to some kind of normal. Well, guess what, that is not going to happen until thousands, or even millions are dead and the blood runs like the oceans.

Why, bec
Papa Ray | Email | 01.11.05 - 5:07 am | #

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONTINUED
Why, because this is the continuation of a war that is two thousand years old. Islamic/Arab/Muslim/Persian extreamists and others are determined to wipe out anyone that does not prescribe and practice their brand of beliefs, religion and culture.

They have been beat back and down, many times in the past. Read your history of the Middle East and of Europe. This time they have the backing, the money and the raw recruits that they have been teaching to hate everything not theirs and anyone not with them for at least the last forty years. They have been training them and preparing them almost as long.

Should we all just dispair and give up? No, we can not, we can not because if we do, they win.

Believe me, you don't want that to happen.

This is my post

Papa Ray
West Texas
USA
Papa Ray | Email | 01.11.05 - 5:10 am | #

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

January 11, 2005 at 5:59 PM  
Blogger Unknown said...

The Decter book is spot-on. RMA, transformation, etc. are just (pre-Rumsfeld) buzz words used to generate process and the "socialization" required to support change in ossified government bureaucracy (that was treated as a political constituency to be fed and kept quiet by the dems). Go watch any of the close-coaching Rumsfeld did w/ his people in front of the press in the early days. When one of his chiefs would talk about transformation, Rumsfeld would quickly get to the microphone and say approx "that's interesting, but the real transformation will depend on the quality and vision of the next dozen senior military the president nominates for leadership positions."

He's a classic American CEO. Choosing the right people is job 1. Setting clear goals is job 2. Accountability w/ frequent feedback is job 3. Providing them support and cover is job 4. Insuring everyone understands they owe their boss (and their boss's boss) the unvarnished truth is job 5, (and before long we have "Rumsfeld's Rules" :-) And unlike the Communists, great CEOs don't shoot those who give it their best, yet fail (we move them out.. And often give them awards or medals).

n.b. the congress (armed services committees) have always been responsible for mentoring and shepherding the mid and upper personnel ranks in the services (finding the Rickover's and preserving them in the face of all the antibodies that argue against change). They are the only government body with any continuity over the decades this takes. They are the ones responsible for (the lack of) adequate quality of leadership in the senior ranks (command that would by omission or commission tolerate the lack of discipline and oversight that led to Abu Ghraib. In hotter wars, that general would have been demoted and sent to the front lines). The congress is also responsible for the thinness of the bench. To say nothing of the post-cold-war politics that led to selection and promotion of yes-men.

Note that those who serve take an oath to protect the Constitution, not an oath to humor a given mood of the electorate. Which is why I think I hear (and I want to hear) passion in the SecDef's voice when he talks about "rebalancing" the force (correcting for the military leadership understandable, but near-treasonous, behavior after Vietnam) because until this is done we are at (terrible) risk - the president must be able to engage in an unpopular conflict to protect us (where there will be times the executive has secret knowledge that demands action, that can not be shared without even greater harm), where the President must be able to make this decision in our interest, and then stand-for-election based on the results.

(nice blog Chester, good words)

January 12, 2005 at 11:09 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Nice post. Check out my site if you can. unsecured loan

October 24, 2005 at 12:30 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

How long have you been at your 10 5 business coaching colors free from home home in level marketing marketing mentoring mentoring mlm multi network pillar steps success success success success training work job? Are you good at 10 5 business coaching colors free from home home in level marketing marketing mentoring mentoring mlm multi network pillar steps success success success success training work? Could you help other businesses that are just starting out get up to speed? Then you are a qualified consultant! And of course, that's only one way to share your knowledge. "How To Start Your Own Coaching/Consulting Business" is my well researched 10 5 business coaching colors free from home home in level marketing marketing mentoring mentoring mlm multi network pillar steps success success success success training work, online webite that you can read and learn at your leisure.
Hope you visit ...

October 24, 2005 at 6:43 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Lots of good mobile electronics information here. Also check out mobile electronics if you get a chance. I was able to lear a lot.

October 27, 2005 at 2:49 PM  
Blogger George said...

business contract softwareFast, Easy Ad Tracking For Maximum Profitsbusiness contract software

October 28, 2005 at 6:52 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Thanks for offering this great service to learn about alarm car karr. I have a website about alarm car karr which makes me very interested in what you have going here. I think I am going to start up my own blog so I can spread the news! Thanks you are offering this great service!

November 3, 2005 at 11:43 AM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Advertising can be a big problem otherwise. A lot of companies reserve a big chunk of their budgets to cover marketing expenditures.

November 4, 2005 at 7:32 AM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

msn sex emoticon
find msn sex emoticon at msn sex emoticon

November 22, 2005 at 12:41 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

good info

January 17, 2006 at 8:38 AM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Hi Guys,

cheap consumer electronics : i get my lastest electronics news on cheap consumer electronics
Daily updated site with rss feed.
Anyone knows a better one ?
Thanks

Gregy

January 24, 2006 at 11:25 AM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Hi There
Nice to see a top notch blog page like you have here.

Regards
roosevelt dimes

January 24, 2006 at 12:23 PM  
Anonymous Anonymous said...

Thanks for the post. It is interesting what you find on Blogger when you look for business processes.

business process definition

February 25, 2006 at 12:38 AM  

Post a Comment

<< Home

Listed on Blogwise